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LAW AND ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA
AND GHANA

LANRE ALADEITAN'

INTRODUCTION
The development of infrastructure to support optimal energy utilization
is a key challenge in most developing countries. This challenge, and
other socio-political issues, has caused several developing countries to
lag behind on the path of economic development. Although the
developmental challenges are multifaceted, this paper examines the role
of the law in the promotion of energy infrastructure development, and the
role that infrastructure plays in directing both the energy process and
development, or absence thereof, in a developing country. This paper is
primarily concerned with energy infrastructure areas that are in acute
need of development and have very poor infrastructure development
indicators. To this effect, the paper examines whether there is a
correlation between the State and the content of its law in terms of
performance, energy sources, energy patterns and use, and levels of
discernible sustainable development in the two West African countries,
Ghana and Nigeria; both of which are former British colonies and share
similar historical antecedents.
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The paper is divided into three major sections. The first section considers
energy development laws in Nigeria by focusing on the Energy
Commission of Nigeria Act, the Electric Power Sector Reform Act, and
the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act. Similarly, the
second section examines energy development laws in Ghana with a focus
on both the Energy Commission and the Public Utilities Regulatory
Commission Acts in the country. Within this section is a comparison of
the state of energy infrastructure development in Nigeria and Ghana. In
the final section, a conclusion is reached based on the review and
comparisons made.
I.

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT LAWS IN NIGERIA

The Energy Commission of Nigeria (Commission) is at the center of
coordinating the systematic development of the various energy resources
of the country. The Commission is "charged with responsibility for the
strategic planning and coordination of national policies in the field of
energy in its entire ramification."' Specifically, the Commission is
mandated to "serve as a center for gathering and disseminating
information relat[ed] to national policy in the field of energy
development," 2 as well as "solv[ing] any interrelated technical problems
that may arise in the implementation of policy relating to the field of
energy." 3
Unfortunately, despite these functions and others," the Commission is
saddled with energy crises still persist in the country. This is most felt
and noticeable in the electricity subsector of the Nigerian energy
industry. Taking power generation and the supply of electricity as
development indicators for the energy industry, the rate of power outage
and inconsistencies in electricity supply are indicative of the energy
infrastructure deficits in Nigeria. In considering these challenges from a
legal perspective, specifically by relying on the functions of the
I.

Energy Commission of Nigeria Act § 4 (1979) [hereinafter ECNA].
2. Id. at §4(a).
3. Id. at §4(b).
4. Id. at § 4(c)-(h) (Some of the other functions of the Commission are advising the
government of the Federation or of a State on questions relating to such aspects as the Government
of the Federation or a State may, from time to time, refer to it; preparing- after consultation with
such agencies of government whose functions relate to the field of energy development or supply as
the Commission considers appropriate -periodic master plans for the balanced and co-ordinated
development of energy in Nigeria; lay down guidelines on the utilization of energy types for specific
purposes and in a prescribed sequence; inquiring into and advising the Government of the Federation
or of the State on the adequate funding of the energy sector including research and development,
production and distribution; collating, analysing and publishing information relating to the field of
energy from all sources, where such information is relevant to the discharge of its functions and
monitoring the performance of the energy sector in the execution of government policies on energy).
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Commission and other provisions of the Energy Commission of Nigeria
Act (ECNA), the critical question is whether there is a correlation
between Nigeria's various legal and institutional frameworks, such as the
Energy Commission of Nigeria and the development of energy
infrastructure. Simply put, this inquiry examines the content of the law in
order to determine whether there are shortcomings within it that impede
the realization of energy infrastructure development in the country.
A review of the ECNA shows that the law, which emerged as a military
decree during military rule in Nigeria, retains most of the undemocratic
principles of governance synonymous with military administration. Of
particular note in this respect is the fact that the Commission lacks
independence in the discharge of its mandate. For instance, the ECNA
provides that "the Head of the Federal Military Government [President]
may give the Commission directions of a general or special nature as to
the manner in which the Commission is to exercise its powers and it shall
be the duty of the Commission to give effect to any such direction."' It
further provided that "no policy initiated by the Commission would be
implemented without prior reference to and approval by the Head of the
Federal Military Government [President]."' This bureaucracy, the intent
of which may be honorable, is nevertheless capable of being abused.
Therefore, it could result in undue interference with viable and sound
technical solutions by the Commission especially if it is not politically
expedient for the President. Aside from Presidential interference, the
roles of the Commission, which are merely advisory and information
gathering as opposed to the power to plan and implement concrete
policies, further confirms a weakness in the content of the Nigerian
energy law for the development of energy infrastructure.
A.

THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR REFORM ACT

Since the installation of the first power-generating plant in Nigeria in
1896,' the Nigerian electricity industry has been characterized as a
struggling industry. To reposition the industry for efficiency, the Electric
Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) 2005 was enacted. The EPSRA
established the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) as
the regulator of the electricity sector, and the Power Holding Company

5.
ECNA, supra note 1, at §5(1).
6.
Id. at § 5(2).
7.
Niger Power Review: Development of Electricity Industry in Nigeria (1960-1985) 1985
pgl-6, cited in 0.1. Okoro & Chikuni, Power Sector Reforms in Nigeria: Opportunities and
Challenges, 18 J. Energy S. Afr. 52, 57(Aug. 2007), available at http://www.erc.uct.ac.zal
jesa/volumel8/18-3jesa-okoro.pdf.
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of Nigeria (PHCN) as the initial holding company.' By virtue of section
99 of the EPSRA, the Electricity Act 9 and the National Electric Power
Authority Act (NEPA)o were repealed. Therefore, EPSRA became the
applicable legal and legislative framework for reform of the Nigerian
electricity industry.
The general concepts and objectives of the EPSRA, as contained in its
preamble are:
to provide for the formation of companies to take over the
functions, assets, liabilities and staff of NEPA; to develop
competitive electricity markets; to establish the Nigerian
Electricity Regulatory Commission; to provide for the licensing
and regulation of the generation, transmission, distribution and
supply of electricity; to enforce such matters as performance
standards, consumer rights and obligations; and to provide for
the determination of tariffs and related matters."
Consequently, the EPSRA is an important piece of legislation that is
critical to energy infrastructure development in the country, especially as
it relates to the development of a competitive energy market, issuance of
generation, transmission, system operation, distribution and trading
licenses, and establishment of a regulatory commission.
1.

Privatization and competitive electricity market development

The EPSRA contemplates the development of a competitive electricity
market in two stages: 1) pre-privatization and 2) post-privatization. To
drive the privatization process of the successor companies 2 to NEPA, the
National Council on Privatization (NCP) is expected to commence the
process in accordance with the provisions of the Public Enterprises
(Privatization and Commercialization) Act at anytime and by such
8. See Electric Power Sector Reform Act (2005), §§ 1, 31 (Nigeria) [hereinafter EPSRA].
9. Electricity Act (2004) Cap. E7, Vol. 5, Laws of the Federation Nigeria.
10.
National Electric Power Authority Act (2004), Cap. N33, Vol. 10, Laws of the Federation
Nigeria.
I1. See Preamble to the EPSRA.
12. The successor companies are established pursuant to the EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 8,
which provides that the National Council on Privatisation shall, within eight months after the
formation of the initial holding company under section I of this Act, take such steps as are necessary
under the Companies and Allied Matters Act to incorporate such number of additional companies,
limited by share as the National Council of Privatization my deem right. This shall be the successor
companies for assuming the assets and liabilities of initial holding company including companies
with functions relating to generation, transmission, trading, and bulk distribution of electricity.
13. The Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act (1999) Cap P.38 and the
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004) [hereinafter LFNJ provide the legal basis for privatization
and commercialization in Nigeria. The Act establishes a council, the National Council on
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means as it deems fit. Coupled with other bureaucracies built into the
EPSRA,14 this latitude given to the NCP is among the factors that militate
against energy infrastructure development in Nigeria. Despite the
overwhelming discretion given to the Minister,'" section 24(2) of the
EPSRA provides criteria to create potential competition of Nigeria's
electricity supply industry."6
Regardless of the criteria provided in section 24(2), the pace of
privatization and development of a competitive electricity market in
Nigeria has been slow and hardly noticeable. It was not until the recent
handing over of the 17 successor companies unbundled from PHCN on
November 01, 2013 that the country recorded a significant step towards
the privatization of its electricity sector. Despite this positive
development, it is important to point out that if the content of the law
were to be taken seriously as crucial to the development of energy
infrastructure in Nigeria, then the PHCN should have ceased to exist by
December 31, 2006 when its interim operating license which was valid
for 18 months 7 from the initial transfer date of its assets and liabilities to
the successor companies'" ought to have expired.
Presumably, the prolonged and extended existence of the PHCN may
have had an adverse effect on the capability of the electricity sector to
develop sufficiently to meet the criteria for full privatization and the
development of a competitive electricity market. Similarly, the fact that
PHCN existed beyond 18 months as contemplated under the EPSRA,
Privatization (NCP) to determine political, economic and social objectives for privatization and
commercialization of public enterprises.
One such bureaucracy is the requirement of EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 24(3), which
14.
provides that the Minister, to whom the President assigns administrative functions in respect of the
electric power sector, cannot make declarations for the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission
to initiate the process for establishing a competitive market without a satisfactory consultation with
the President and the National Council on Privatization. Ordinarily, this can be viewed as procedural
but, having regards to governance challenge in the country, political rather than technical
consideration may determine the decision of the President and the Council.
15.
"Minister" is a public official and political appointee of the President. Specifically,
Minister in this context is the Honourable Minister of Power and Steel, or any other Minister to
whom the President may from time to time assign administrative functions in respect of the EPSRA.
16.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 24(2)(a)-(c) ("the degree of privatization that has occurred; the
existence of a sufficiently large number of potential competitive entities . . . and the existence of
other preconditions, including the necessary metering and information technology infrastructures,
required for the operation of a more competitive electricity market.").
17.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 7.
By an order published in the Federal Gazette, the National Council on Privatization gave
18.
l" July 2005 as the initial transfer date of the assets, liabilities and staff of NEPA to PHCN. To
terminate by eighteen months from that date, 31" of December 2006. However, there is a claim that
the assets, liabilities, and staff of the PHCN were transferred on 1" July 2006 to the successor
companies incorporated in November 2005. It is submitted that the above claim is nothing but
incorrect as PHCN staff even as of October 2013 still vows to resist any such transfer.
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without any evidence of an amendment to the EPSRA to permit the
same, seems to justify the premise that there is indeed a correlation
between the law, its implementation and energy infrastructure
development in Nigeria.
2.

The Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission

Prior to the enactment of the EPSRA, the roles of regulator and operator
of the entire electricity industry in Nigeria were intertwined in the
defunct National Electric Power Authority (NEPA)." This negatively
impacted the effectiveness of the electricity industry since it was
practically impossible for NEPA to sanction itself for operational
omissions and failings. The establishment of the Nigerian Electricity
Regulatory Commission (NERC), pursuant to the EPSRA with
regulatory functions and powers only without operational role, is
considered impressive and novel to the Nigerian electricity industry.
Some of the key the objectives of NERC are:
(a) "to create, promote, and preserve efficient industry and
market structures, and to ensure the optimal utilisation [sic]
of resources for the provision of electricity services."20
(b) "to maximize access to electricity services, by promoting
and facilitating consumer connections to distribution systems
in both rural and urban areas." 2 1
(c) "to ensure that the prices charged by licensees are fair to
consumers and are sufficient to allow the licensees to finance
their activities and to allow for reasonable earnings for
efficient operation."
(d) "to ensure that regulation is fair and balanced for licensees,
consumers, investors, and other stakeholders."22
To achieve the above objectives and others, EPSRA stipulates that
NERC shall perform the following functions:

19.
For commentary on the dissolution, see Presidential Task Force on Power, Why Was
Nigeria Electric Power Authority (NEPA) Dissolved and PHCN Broken Down Into 18 Difference
Companies?, NIGERIA POWER REFORM, http://nigeriapowerreform.org/index.php?option=com
content&view=article&id=65%3Awhy-was-nigeria-electric-power-authority-nepa-dissolved-andphcn-broken-down-into-18-difference-companies&catid=31%3Ageneral (last visited April 19,
2014).
20.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 32(l)(a).
21.
Id. at §32(l)(b).
22.
Id. at §32(l)(d) -(f).
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(a) promote competition and private sector participation, when
and where feasible; (b) establish or, as the case may be, approve
appropriate operating codes and safety, security, reliability, and
quality standards; (c) establish appropriate consumer rights and
obligations regarding the provision and use of electricity
services; (d) license and regulate persons engaged in the
generation, transmission, system operation, distribution, and
trading of electricity; approve amendments to the market rules:
(j) monitor the operation of the electricity market; and (g)
undertake such other activities which are necessary or
convenient for the better carrying out of or giving effect to the
objects of the Commission.23
For the attainment of its objectives and effective performance of its
functions, seven divisions with strategic roles were created within
NERC. The divisions include the Office of the Chairman, which is
composed of a number of support units that provide overall governance
and coordination of NERC's activities. These units include: the
Commission's Secretariat; the Strategy and Project Management Office;
the Procurement Unit; and the Media and Public Relations unit.24 The
Engineering Standards and Safety Division,25 which has the task of
developing and monitoring compliance of technical codes and standards
for all operators as well as active participation in the technical evaluation
of all license applications submitted to NERC, is also one of the seven
strategic divisions.
Recognizing the important role of support services, NERC created the
Finance and Management Services Division26 to offer support in critical
areas such as human resources, finance and accounts, information
technology, and protocol. In the same vein, the Government and
Consumer Affairs Division was also created.27 This division has the
responsibility of developing consumer regulations and ensuring that
operators meet the minimum standards of services provided in those
regulations.

23.

Id. at § 32(2)(a)-(g).

24.
About Us, NIGERIAN ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.nercng.org/
index.php/about-us/nerc-divisions (last visited February 18, 2014).

25.

Id.

26.

NIGERIAN ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra note 24.

27.

Id. The Government and Consumer Affairs Division also embark on consumer

enlightenment and has a mandate of ensuring the speedy resolution of consumer disputes.
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For the coordination of licensing procedures, a primary responsibility of
NERC, the Legal, Licensing, and Enforcement Division,2 was created.
In addition to coordinating licensing procedures, this division is also
expected to provide legal support and advisory services, as well as
enforce all of NERC's orders and decisions.
Another strategic division within NERC is the Market Competition and
Rates Division.29 This division is responsible for determining tariffs,
monitoring of the electricity market to prevent abuse of market power as
well as conducting commercial evaluation of all license applications. In
addition, there is the Renewable Energy, Research and Development
Division" which is responsible for providing NERC with the required
database and policy instruments to carry out its various activities as well
as to drive its renewable energy programs.
With the foregoing structure in place and pursuant to the authority given
under the EPSRA of 2005,31 the Commission established a methodology
for regulating electricity prices called the Multi-Year Tariff Order
(MYTO).32 The MYTO provides a 15 year tariff path for the Nigerian
electricity industry, receiving limited minor reviews each year in light of
changes to a limited number of parameters, such as inflation and gas
prices." MYTO receives major reviews every five years when all inputs
are reviewed in conjunction with stakeholders. 4 Similarly, pursuant to
Section 26 of the EPSRA, market rules were developed for the
establishment and governance of markets related to electricity and
ancillary services, amongst others.35
NERC has also provided for a procedure to obtain licenses and permits in
accordance with the EPSRA.3 6 It also set regulations on all matters that
are required or necessary for giving effect to the Electric Power Sector
Reform Act of 2005. Some of the regulations prescribed by NERC
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 76.
32.
See Electric Power Sector Reform Act: Notice of Proposed Establishment of a
Methodology for a Multi-Year Tariff Order (2007) 94:18 O.G., B125 § I (Nigeria), available at
http://www.accessbankplc.com/Library/Documents/2010%20Bankers%20Committee%20Conferenc
e%20Resources/Power%20Sector/Electric%20power%20sector%20reform%20act%20(2005).pdf
[hereinafter EPRSA Notice]. See also Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) 11 (2012-2017), NIGERIAN
ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

February
33.
34.
35.
36.

http://www.nercng.org/index.php/myto-2

(last visited

18, 2014).
EPRSA Notice, supra note 32, at 1I1.
Id. at 11.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 62(2).
Id. at § 62.
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include Business Rules; Reporting Compliance Regulation in 2009;
Application for License Regulation in 2010; License and Operating Fees
Regulation in 2010; Regulation for Captive Power Generation; and
Customer Complaints Handling Standards and Procedure.37
In the same vein, and in accordance with the EPSRA, NERC
performance standards, codes, and manuals for the Nigerian
Industry, which is binding on applicable licensees." To this
metering, distribution, and grid codes, together with the health
manual, have been developed and approved.

has set up
Electricity
effect, the
and safety

From the foregoing, the activities of NERC in terms of providing
standards and regulation for the electricity industry appear to be heading
in the right direction. However, this effort is yet to translate into adequate
power generation and distribution as expected by the Nigerian public.
Suffice it to say, the deplorable situation of the Nigerian electricity
industry remains unabated without any physical sign of improvement
despite NERC's existence for over eight years." To this effect, an
evaluation of NERC's performance based on the frequency of power
outages and inconsistencies of electricity supply rather than the existence
of regulations, codes and standards would suggest that NERC is an
ineffective regulatory authority with no positive impact on energy
infrastructure development in Nigeria.
3.

Licenses and Tariffs

The EPSRA in section 62(1) provides that, "no one is authorized or
permitted to construct, own, operate, or engage in the business of
electricity generation - excluding captive generation, electricity
transmission, system operation, electricity distribution, or trading in
electricity, without first obtaining the necessary and appropriate
license."40 A "contravention of section 62(1) amounts to an offense, and
anyone found liable will be convicted and subjected to a fine not
exceeding five hundred thousand Naira (N500,000), or imprisonment for
a period not exceeding two years, or to both fine and imprisonment."4 1
There are, however, a few exceptions to section 62(1). For instance, "a

37.

See

generally

REGULATIONS,

NIGERIAN

ELECTRICITY

REGULATION

COMMISSION,

available at http://www.nercng.org/index.php/document-library/Regulations/ (last visited February
18, 2014).
38.
Id. at § 81.
39. The Nigerian Electricity Regulation Commission was formally inaugurated on October 31,
2005.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 62(1).
40.
41.
Id. at § 62(5).
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person may construct, own or operate an undertaking for generating
electricity not exceeding one megawatt (MW) in aggregate at a site or an
undertaking for distribution for electricity with a capacity not exceeding
100 kilowatts (KW) in aggregate at a site, or such other capacity as the
Commission may determine from time to time, without a license. "42
Obtaining an appropriate license is therefore essential to operating within
the sector. After obtaining a license, licensees are expected to comply
with the provisions of the license, applicable regulations, codes, and
other requirements issued by NERC from time to time.43 Specifically, the
EPSRA provides that a generation license shall authorize the licensee "to
construct, own, operate, and maintain a generation station for the
purposes of generation and supply of electricity"' and that a generation
licensee "may sell power or ancillary services to any of the classes of
persons so specified in the license,"45 subject to such terms and
conditions as the Commission may fix in the license and as the
circumstances may require.46 For the transmission license, the EPSRA
provides that the licensee is authorized to carry on "grid construction,
operation, and maintenance of transmission system within Nigeria, or a
grid system that connects Nigeria to a neighboring jurisdiction, subject to
such terms and conditions as the Commission may set forth"47 .
Perhaps due to the peculiarity of the infrastructural requirement for
transmission, the EPSRA allows for only one company to be licensed to
undertake transmission activity in the country.48 It is important to point
out that by virtue of section 65(2), the transmission licensee may also
have the obligation to carry out system operations, including the
procurement of ancillary services, pursuant to the terms of a system
operation license which is attached to a transmission license.49 As can be
inferred from the above provision, a system operation license is a
separate license subject to such terms and conditions as the Commission

42.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 62(2).
43.
Id. at § 63.
44. Id. at § 64 (1).
45.
Id. at § 64 (2).
46. Id. at § 64.
47.
Id. at § 65(l).
48.
The Act refers to successor companies for both generation and distribution of electricity
but in the case of transmission, Section 25 (b) refers to the successor company that has been issued a
transmission license and a System operation license while Section 65 (2) also refers to a successor
company. Furthermore, the unbundling plan and policy for the electricity sector which has now been
implemented provided for only one transmission company.
49.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 65.
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may set forth."' A system operation license authorizes its holder to carry
on the following activities amongst others:
(a) generation scheduling, commitment and dispatch; (b)
transmission scheduling and generation outage co-ordination; (c)
transmission congestion
management; (d) international
transmission co-ordination; (e) procurement and scheduling of
ancillary services and system planning for long term capacity; (f)
administration of the wholesale electricity market, including the
activity of administration of settlement payments, in accordance
with the market rules; and (g) such other activities as may be
required for reliable and efficient system operation."
Regarding distribution licenses, the EPSRA provides that its holder is
authorized:
to construct, operate and maintain a, distribution system and
facilities, including, but not limited to, the following activities as
may be specified in the [license]: (a) the connection of customers
for the purpose of receiving a supply of electricity; (b) the
installation, maintenance and reading of meters, billing and
collection; and (c)such other distribution service, as may be
prescribed for the purposes of this section.52
Furthermore, it is important to point out that a distribution licensee may
also be obligated "to provide electricity to its distribution customers,
pursuant to the terms of a trading [license] issued by the Commission to
the distribution licensee."" Basically, the importance of section 67(2) is
that the holder of a distribution license can also be granted a trading
license. The effect on a licensee having both distribution and trading
licenses is that such a licensee may purchase power for resale from
another trading licensee and may with the prior consent of the
Commission purchase from other sources,54 subject to exceptions in
sections 25(a) and 26.5 Although a holder of a distribution license can
50.
Id. at § 66.
51.
Id.
52.
Id. at § 67(1).
53.
Id. at §67(2).
54.
Id. at § 67(3).
55.
Id. at §§ 25(a), 26. (Section 25(a) provides that the trading licensee- holding a bulk
purchase and resale license under section 67(2), or an interim license for this purpose, and to which
the function of bulk procurement and bulk sale of power and ancillary services has been transferred
pursuant to part I of this Act-shall engage in the purchase and resale of electrical power and
ancillary services from independent power producers and from the successor generation companies,
in accordance with its license; while section 26 provides that immediately following the declaration
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perform certain functions within the terms of a trading license, the
licensee is nevertheless exempted from the rights and obligations of a
trading license as described in section 25(a) in relation to a distribution
licensee under section 26 of the EPSRA. As for the trading license, the
EPSRA provides that:
a trading licensee shall be permitted to engage in the purchasing,
selling, and trading of electricity and that the Commission shall
have the authority to determine the terms and conditions of
trading [licenses] as may be appropriate in the circumstances,
and having due regard to the nature of the activities in which the
licensee intends to engage.
The EPSRA in yet another significant provision with regard to
distribution and trading licenses gives power to the NERC to issue a
temporary bulk purchase and resale license, which gives the licensee "the
ability to purchase electrical power and ancillary services from
independent power producers and successor generation companies for
the purpose of resale to one or more other licensees, or to an eligible
customer.""
Section 68(3) of the EPSRA seeks to introduce and promote a
transparent and competitive regime for the electricity sector by providing
that all contracts for procuring ancillary services - the purchase of bulk
power and the purchase of electrical power and ancillary services,
respectively - "shall be awarded according to an open, transparent, and
competitive manner, pursuant to a procedure established by the
Commission, unless the circumstances require otherwise and the
Commission allows or requires an alternative method.""
The licensing regime under the EPSRA can be regarded as standard,
when compared to other regulatory and licensing regimes dealing with
licenses and tariffs. As with most licenses and permits, the EPSRA
provides extensive restrictions on the various licenses" including the
by the Minister, under section 24(3), that a more competitive market is to be initiated: (a) the trading
licensee described in section 25 (a) shall not enter into any further contracts for the purchase of
electrical power or ancillary services and it shall, in accordance with its license, begin the process of
novating its existing rights and obligations to purchase electrical power and ancillary services to
other licensees).
56.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 68.
57.
Id. at § 68(2).
58.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 68(3).
59.
Id. at § 69(1) (A licensee shall not, except as provided in section 26(7), assign or cede his
license or transfer his undertaking, or any part thereof, by way of sale, mortgage, lease, exchange, or
otherwise without the prior consent of the Commission provided that, should the Commission
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procedure for the application of a license,' the terms and conditions of
licenses,6 1 and the renewal,62 amendment," cancellation,'
and
enforcement of licenses. However, the test of its adequacy for the
development of energy infrastructure in the country will be determined
by the details and attention given to its implementation in terms of
transparency, accountability, and performance evaluation.
Keeping in mind the aforementioned specific laws that seek to reform the
Nigerian electricity sector, it is important to note that in 2005, the
Federal Government of Nigeria - in what may appear to be a
demonstration of willingness to confront the challenges of infrastructure
development - enacted the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory
Commission Act (ICRCA).
B.

INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSION REGULATORY COMMISSION ACT

(ICRCA), 2005
The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act of 2005
(ICRCA) empowers the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory
Commission (ICRC), established pursuant to section 14 of the ICRCA, to
"enter into a contract with or grant concession to any duly pre-qualified
project proponent in the private sector for the financing, construction,
operation or maintenance of any infrastructure that is financially viable
or any development facility of the Federal Government." 6 Section 14
provides that, "the Commission (a) shall be a body corporate with
perpetual succession and a common seal; (b) may sue or be sued in its
corporate name; and (c) may acquire, hold or dispose of any property,
determine that in any instance the circumstances so require, it may establish license terms and
conditions providing its specific or general consent for any or all of the foregoing. No licensee shall,
without the prior written consent of the Commission, acquire by purchase or otherwise, or affiliate
with, the license or undertaking of any other licensee or person that is in the business of electricity
Generation, transmission, system operation, distribution, or trading, other than as provided for in
sections 65(2), 67(2), and 68, provided that the Commission may, as part of its consent, impose
conditions which were approved by the Commission).
60.
EPSRA, supra note 8, at § 70(1) (providing details on the procedure for the application of
a license).
61.
Id. at § 71 (providing the conditions attached to the licenses).
62.
Id. at § 72(1) (providing that Subject to the Act, the holder of a license may apply for a
renewal of the license before it expires and that an application for the renewal of a license shall be
made to the Commission in the manner and within the period prescribed, and be accompanied by the
prescribed fee, if any).
63.
Id. at § 73 (providing the processes of amending license).
64.
Id. at§ 74 (providing the procedure for cancellation of license).
65.
Id. at § 75 (providing the enforcement powers of the Commission on licenses).
66.
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act (2005), § 1(1). The categories of
projects to which the ICRC Act applies are investment and development projects relating to any
infrastructure of any Federal Government Ministry, Agency, or Corporation. Infrastructure
Concession Regulatory Commission Act (2005), § 1(2).
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movable or immovable for the purpose of carrying out any of its
functions under this Act."6 Its headquarters is located in the federal
capital territory, Abuja.6 ' The Commission is saddled with the
responsibility to
(a) take custody of every concession agreement made under [the
ICRC Act] and monitor compliance with the terms and
conditions of such agreement; (b) ensure efficient execution of
any concession agreement or contract entered into by the
Government .

.

. [and] (d) perform such other duties as may be

directed by the President . .. and as are necessary or expedient to
ensure the efficient performance of the functions of the

Commission. 69
The ICRCA mandates every Federal Government Ministry, Agency, and
Corporation to prioritize infrastructure projects." Notably, only priority
projects that are qualified for concession are forwarded to the Federal
Executive Council (FEC) for approval." As a result of this requirement,
it is only the FEC that can grant and issue a guarantee, letter of comfort,
or undertake any concession agreement made pursuant to ICRCA.72
The fact that a functional electricity industry will positively impact the
overall economy of the country should qualify the development of an
energy infrastructure project as a priority under the ICRCA. The
application of ICRCA provisions to energy infrastructure development is
also premised on the fact that the requirements for transparency and
competitiveness are consistent with those of the EPSRA." In this respect,
ICRCA specifically provides that any infrastructure or development
project or contract for financing, construction, operation, or maintenance
must undergo competitive public bidding.74 ICRCA, however recognizes
certain circumstances where "only one contractor or project proponent
applies or submits a bid or proposal, or . .. where only one contractor or
project proponent meets the prequalification requirements" as an
67.
Id. at § 14(2). "Body corporate" refers to a "legal entity (such as an association, company,
person, government, government agency, or institution) identified by a particular name. Also called
corporation, corporate body or corporate entity." Body Corporate, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/body-corporate.html#ixzz20cxlxisr (last visited
March 26, 2013).
68.
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act, supra note 66, at § 14(3).
69.
Id. at § 20(a)-(d).
70.
Id. at § 2.
71.
Id. at § 2(2).
72.
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act, supra note 66, at § 3.
73. See EPSRA, supra note 8 and accompanying sections.
74. Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act, supra note 66, at § 4(l).
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exemption to competitive bidding." In such circumstances, the ICRCA
empowers the Ministry, Agency, or Corporation to undertake direct
negotiation without competitive bidding. 6
The intention of this discretionary power given to the Ministries,
Agencies, and Corporations is well intended for genuine cases deserving
such exemption. The fear, however, is that the discretionary power
creates a loophole for unscrupulous bureaucrats who can abuse the
exemption and enter into a contract or grant a concession on
considerations other than sound financial and technical capabilities of a
project proponent. 7 This exemption may, therefore, be counterproductive to achieving infrastructure development in the country
because the process may be manipulated in favor of incompetent project
sponsors or of proponents who may abandon the project or who simply
cannot deliver.
As an assurance to encourage both foreign and domestic investment in
infrastructure development projects, ICRCA provides for recovery of
investment. The operation of the recovery of investment is, however,
subject to the concession contract entered into by any project proponent
or contractor who contracts for financing, construction, operation, or
maintenance. It is important to note that "[n]o agreement reached in
respect [to the ICRCA] shall be arbitrarily suspended, stopped, cancelled
or changed except in accordance with the provisions of the Act.""
With the far-reaching mandate described above, it is expected that the
effective execution of the ICRC's functions is appropriate to redressing
the infrastructure challenges bedeviling the Nigerian electricity sector.
However, despite the promising provisions of the ICRCA, the limitations
of filing suits against any member, officer, or employee of the ICRC,
coupled with the application of the Public Officer Protection Act" and
the secrecy provisions," contravene the principles and fundamentals of
75.
Id. at § 5(a) -(b).
76. Id. at § 5(b). The ICRCA supports the intentions of the EPSRA, supra note 8, that the
energy sector in Nigeria be driven by the private sector.
77. The latitude provided by this exemption can be relied on as a legal justifiable basis for
corrupt officials to circumvent the letter and intent of the Act by awarding contract under suspicious
and non-transparent circumstances.
78.
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act, supra note 66, at §7(l).
79. Id. at § I1.
80. Id. at § 29.
81.
Id. at § 35(1) provides that a member of the Board, the Director-General or any other
officer or employee shall- (a) not, for his personal gain, make use of any information which has
come to his knowledge in the exercise of his powers or is obtained by him in the ordinary course of
his duty as a member of the Board or as the Director-General, officer or employee of the
Commission; (b) treat as-confidential any information which has come to his knowledge in the
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transparency and accountability which are the universally acknowledged
hallmark of private sector participation. Notwithstanding these setbacks,
it appears that the secrecy provision, as provided in ICRCA, which may
deny interested parties access to vital public records and information
within the ICRC may have been watered down by the provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act recently passed by the National Assembly
which sought to make public records and information more freely
available." To this extent, the ICRC, if not overwhelmed by
administrative bottlenecks and undue interference may be effective in
delivering on energy and other infrastructure projects.
II.

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT LAWS IN GHANA

Coupled with obsolete plants, the increasing demand for power by the
growing customer population (about 1,500,000 in Ghana) overwhelms
the electricity supply and results in an overloaded network which makes
power delivery very difficult." It seems therefore, that the Ghanaian
electricity industry (similar to its Nigerian counterpart) has suffered from
infrastructure decay which has resulted in transmission deterioration,
overloaded transformer substations, and high system losses throughout
the extensive transmission system covering all regions of the country." It
is important to mention here that the infrastructure challenges of the
Ghanaian energy sector are not peculiar to transmission only, but have
also included electricity distribution infrastructures, which were old and
obsolete, "leading to frequent interruptions in power supply and
relatively high system losses.""
To reposition the sector, a new regulatory policy evolved as part of a
broader national infrastructure and public institutional reform program.
Some of the objectives envisioned by the reform included the
introduction of a transparent competitive regime in electricity supply, as
exercise of his powers or is obtained by him in the performance of his duties under this Act; (c) not
disclose any information referred to under paragraph (b) of this subsection, except as required by
law. (2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) of this section commits an
offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine of not less than N50,000 or imprisonment for a
term not exceeding 2 years or to both such fine and imprisonment).
82.
See Freedom of Information Act (2011), Preamble, § I (Nigeria), available at
http://www.nigeria-law.org/Legislation/LFN/201 I /Freedom%200f%20Information%20Act.pdf (last
visited April 19, 2014).
83.
See e.g. Hon. Gifty E. Kusi, Chairperson of Parliamentary Select Committee on Mines &
Energy/Deputy Majority Whip, Ghana's Experience With Power Sector Reform: Legislative and
Policy Issues (Oct. 5-7, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/
parliamentarian forum/kusi-ghanapsr.pdf (last visited 21/03/2014).
84.

Sectorial Overview, MINISTRY OF ENERGY, REPUBLIC OF GHANA, http://www.energymin.

gov.gh/?page-id=78 (last visited April 10, 2013).
85.
Id.
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well as the encouragement of private sector investment for the
development of a sustainable electricity industry." In this regard, two
key regulatory institutions were created by acts of parliament to replace
the Electricity Corporation Decree of 1967" which repealed the
Electricity Act of 1961 and established the Electricity Corporation of
Ghana (ECG)." The ECG remained the sole entity responsible for
electricity supply and the distribution networks nationwide until the
commencement of the electricity reform in the mid-1990s."9 The two
regulatory institutions are the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission
(PURC)," established under the Pubic Utilities Regulatory Commission
Act of 1997 (Act 538), and the Energy Commission (GEC),' established
under the Energy Commission Act 1997 (Act 514).
Under the current regulatory scheme, "the Ministry of Energy is
responsible for the broad policy direction of the electricity industry; the
[GEC] is responsible for indicative national planning and licensing of
electricity utilities and technical standards, while the PURC is
responsible for economic regulation, monitoring of service quality, and
ensuring fair competition among utilities."92 The clear demarcation of
responsibilities of these institutions will allow for easy coordination and
accountability of each if there is a failing in the performance of their
respective functions.
In order to determine the correlation between law and energy
infrastructure development, the provisions of both the Energy
Commission Act of 1997 (Act 514) and the Public Utilities Regulatory
Commission Act of 1997 (Act 538) will be examined.
A.

ENERGY COMMISSION ACT OF 1997 (ACT 514)

The Energy Commission Act (ECA) established the GEC to regulate,
manage, develop, and utilize energy resources in Ghana and grant
licenses for the transmission, wholesale supply, distribution, and sale of
86.
Resource Center for Energy Economics and Regulation, Institute of Statistical, Social and
Economic Research, University of Ghana, GUIDE TO ELECTRIC POWER IN GHANA (July 2005),
available at http://www.beg.utexas.edulenergyecon/IDA/USAID/RC/Guide-toElectric%20Power
in Ghana.pdf (last visited February 13, 2012).
87.
For more information on the history of the government in Ghana, see The National
Liberation Council and the Busia Years, GHANA WEB, http://www.ghanaweb.com/
GhanaHomePage/history/1966-71.php (last visited April 19, 2014).
88.
See Donat-Peter Hader, THE LAW OF ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 362
(Adrian J. Bradbrook et al. eds., 2005).
89.
Id. at 26.
90.
See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
91.
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
92.
Id. at 25-26.
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electricity and natural gas. Other responsibilities of the GEC include
regulating, refining, store bulk distribution, marketing, and sale of
petroleum products. Typically, the GEC is a body corporate with
perpetual succession and a common seal. It may sue and be sued in its
corporate name." Specifically, the GEC's objectives, functions, and
powers are to:
"(a) recommend national policies for the development and
utilisation [sic] of indigenous energy resources; (b) advise the
Minister on national policies for the efficient economical and
safe supply of electricity, natural gas, and petroleum products
considering the national economy; (c) prepare, review and
update periodically indicative national plans to ensure that
reasonable demands for energy are met; (d) secure a
comprehensive data base for national decision making on the
extent of development and utilisation [sic] of energy resources
available to the nation; (e) receive and assess applications, and
grant licences under this Act to public utilities for the
transmission, wholesale supply distribution, and sale of
electricity and natural gas; (f) establish and enforce, in
consultation with the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission,
standards of performance for public utilities engaged in the
transmission, wholesale supply, distribution and sale of
electricity and natural gas; (g) promote and ensure uniform rules
of practice for the transmission, wholesale supply, distribution
and sale of electricity and natural gas; (h) receive and assess
applications and grant licences under this Act for the refining,
storage, bulk transportation, marketing and sale of petroleum
products; (i) establish and enforce standards of performance for
bodies engaged in the supply, marketing, and sale of petroleum
products; promote competition in the supply, marketing and sale
of petroleum products; (k) maintain a register of public utilities,
petroleum products marketing companies, retail stations and
reseller outlets licensed under this Act in the country; (1) pursue
and ensure strict compliance with this Act and the Regulations;
(m) and perform any other function assigned to it under this Act
or any other enactment." 94
The explicit nature of the provisions of the Ghanaian Energy
Commission Act (GECA) regarding the powers and functions of the
Ghanaian Energy Commission provides the necessary enabling
93.
94.

The Energy Commission Act (1997), § 1(2) (Ghana) [hereinafter ECA].
Id. § 2.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol20/iss1/11

18

Aladeitan: A Case Study of Nigeria and Ghana

2014]

A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA AND GHANA

191

environment for the development of energy infrastructure in Ghana.
Particularly useful to note is the development of rules of practice and
standards of performance from an analytical perspective. The successful
changes recorded so far in the Ghanaian electricity industry seem to
suggest that the content of energy law in Ghana, which has translated
into the efficient and transparent generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity, as well as the encouragement of private sector
participation in the Ghanaian electricity industry is heading in the right
direction.
Compared to the Nigerian Energy Commission (NEC), the regulatory
role of the Ghanaian Energy Commission (GEC) is a radical departure
from the mere policy formulation and central coordinating roles of its
Nigerian counterpart. The GEC plays a pivotal role in the issuance of
transmission, wholesale supply, distribution, and sale of electricity or
natural gas.95 A notable provision regarding the application for
transmission, wholesale supply, distribution, or sale of electricity
licenses is that the GEC is expected to acknowledge receipt within 10
working days of receipt of an application and inform the applicant in
writing of the decision of the GEC within a reasonable period after the
ten days, but not to exceed 60 days.96
Although the GEC reserves the right under Section 18 to modify a
license granted pursuant to and in accordance with the Act, no
modifications can be made "unless [the Commission] has given at least
sixty working days written notice . . . stating that [the Commission]
proposes to make the modification, and . . . setting out the effect of the

modification."" For purposes of fairness, the GEC is expected in all
cases to consider any representations or objections that are made to it
before the modifications are made. Notably, the notice "shall be given by
publication in the manner that [the GEC] considers appropriate for the
purposes of bringing the [proposed modifications] . . . to the attention of

persons likely to be affected by them and by sending a copy of the notice
to the licensee."" Furthermore, any expense incurred or damage caused
as a result of modification to a license shall be considered part of the
capital expenditure of the licensee," presumably for purposes of

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

ECA, supra note 93, at § 11(a).
Id. at § 13.
Id.at § 18(2).
ECA, supra note 93, at § 18(4).
Id. at § 18(5).
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compensation. The ECA also deals with suspension and cancellation of
licenses in a fair and just manner."'
Beyond the general provision on licenses, there are specific provisions
about the transmission, wholesale supply, and distribution of electricity
and natural gas. The provision regarding transmission pertains to both
interconnected transmission systems and a transmission license."o' A
license granted in this respect authorizes the licensee "to operate
exclusively on the national interconnected transmission systems for the
transmission of electricity or natural gas throughout the country." 02
A key condition, among others, in granting a transmission license is "the
safe, reliable economic dispatch and operation of the national
interconnected systems for the transmission of electricity and natural gas
without discrimination to a wholesale supplier of electricity or natural
gas licensed under" the ECA."' With respect to wholesale supply
licenses, the GEC is also empowered to grant licenses for the operation
of facilities and installations as well as for the wholesale supply of
electricity or natural gas.'" A licensed public utility is authorized to
produce electricity or natural gas to supply distribution companies and
bulk customers."' The grant of a wholesale supply license is nevertheless
subject to the promotion of safe, reliable, and economic operation of the
interconnected transmission systems in the country, in addition to other
conditions."0'

Another license provided for under the ECA is the license for the
distribution and sale of electricity and natural gas, without discrimination
in areas or zones as designated and specified in the license.' In granting
this license, the GEC is to
take into account (a) the demand and supply of electricity or
natural gas in the designated area or zone, (b) the capability to
interconnect distribution facilities or installations with
transmission systems in the designated area or zone, and (c) the

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at§ 19.
Id. at§23(1).
Id. at § 23(2).
Id. at § 24(1)(a).
Id.at §25(1).
Id. at §25(2).
ECA, supra note 93, at § 25(1)-(2).
Id. at § 26(i)(b).
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ability to fulfill the obligation to provide electricity or natural gas
within the designated area or zone."
Perhaps in a bid to ensure the effectiveness of licensees in their
respective spheres of operation, the ECA stipulates performance
standards for electricity and natural gas public utilities. The required
performance standards that pertain to the electricity sector "include
matters relating to . . . voltage stability . . . maximum number of
scheduled and unscheduled outages . . . number and duration of load
shedding periods, and . . . metering."" In the event that a licensee "fails
to meet a required standard of performance . . . [the licensee may be]

required to pay the compensation determined by the Board to a person
adversely affected as a result of the failure,""o in addition to any penalty
provided under the ECA or any other enactment. Furthermore, "[t]he
requirement for payment of compensation under this section (a) does not
limit the right to any other remedy at law which is available to the
complainant, and (b) does not preclude the [GEC] from taking" other
legal measures that "the [GEC] has the right to impose in respect of the
act or omission that constitutes the failure.""'
The ECA established an Energy Fund, which is to be funded from
government levies on petroleum products, electricity, and natural gas as
may be determined by the Cabinet and approved by the Parliament, as
well as by grants and money that the Commission receives in the
performance of its functions." 2 The Energy Fund was created for:
(a) the promotion of energy efficiency and productive uses of
electricity, natural gas and petroleum products, (b) the promotion
of projects for the development and utilisation [sic] of renewable
energy resources, including solar energy, (c) human resource
development in the energy sector, and (d) any other relevant
purposes determined by" the Commission."
In order to ensure energy infrastructure development, the Minister
responsible for Energy - on the advice of the Commission - is

empowered to use legislative instruments to make regulations for
electricity or natural resources; for the conservation of electricity or
natural gas; and for the expansion, planning, safety criteria, reliability,
108.
109.
110.
11.
112.
113.

Id. at § 26.
Id. at § 27(2)(a).
Id. at § 27(3).
Id. at § 27(3) - (4).
ECA, supra note 93, at§ 4 1.
Id. at § 42.
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and cost effectiveness of the interconnected transmission systems." 4 The
Minister is also expected to make regulations:
on minimum

standards and procedures for constructions,

operation and maintenance of facilities and installations .

the protection of mains, pipes, electrical

.

. for

or natural gas

installations and services . . . for the protection of life and

property and general safety of the public in respect of natural gas
and electricity services . . . for the operation of the electricity
transmission utility, and . . . for the operation of the gas
transmission utility". . . as well as the regulation of the

operation of the gas transmission utility amongst others."'
Considering the role of the GEC and the licensing procedure put in place
by the ECA, it would seem that the legal and regulatory scheme of the
country's energy sector is positioned towards tackling infrastructure
challenges via a myriad of public and privatized utilities. The content of
the law, coupled with the level of improvements in the country's
electricity sector, tend to lend credence to the proposition that there is a
correlation between the content of the law, state institutions, and energy
infrastructure development.
B.

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION (PURC)

The other establishment in Ghana that played a fundamental role in the
development of energy infrastructure is the Public Utilities Regulatory
Commission (PURC). It was established under Act 538 as a "body
corporate"" 7 with perpetual succession and a common seal."' It may sue
and be sued in its corporate name." 9 The PURC regulatory mandates are
(a) to provide guidelines on rates chargeable for provision of
utility services; (b) to examine and approve rates chargeable for
provision of utility services; (c) to protect the interest of
consumers and providers of utility services; (d) to monitor
standards of performance for provision of services; (e) to initiate
114.
Id.at§56.
115.
Id.at§56.
116.
Id.at§56.
117.
A legal entity (such as an association, company, person, government, government agency,
or institution) identified by a particular name; also called corporation, corporate body or corporate
entity. See Body Corporate, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, available at http://www.businessdictionary.
com/definition/body-corporate.html#ixzz2wzMRqcyP (last visited March 25, 2014).
118.
The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act (1997), § 1(2) (Ghana) [hereinafter
PURC].
119.
Id.
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and conduct investigations into standards of quality of service
given to consumers; (f) to promote fair competition among
public utilities; (g) to conduct studies relating to economy and
efficiency of public utilities.' 20
The PURC is mandated to make such valuation of the property of public
utilities as it deems necessary for the purposes of the Public Utilities
Commission.12' The PURC also has the power to collect and compile
such data on public utilities as it deems necessary for the performance of
its functions.122 Notably, the independence of the PURC is affirmed by
Section 4 of the Act, which provides that the PURC "shall not be subject
to the direction or control of any person or authority in the performance
of its functions." 23
A visible correlation between law and energy infrastructure development
is noticeable in the provisions of the PURC which imposes a duty on
licensed or authorized public utilities to:
(a) maintain its equipment and property used in the provision of
the service in such condition as to enable it to effectively provide
the service; (b) make such reasonable effort as may be necessary
to provide to the public service that is safe, adequate, efficient,
reasonable and non-discriminatory; and (c) make such repairs,
changes, extensions and improvements in or to the service as
may be necessary or proper for the efficient delivery of the

service to the consumer.124
By virtue of the establishing Act, the PURC may on its own discover or
receive a complaint that the service provided by a public utility is not in
accordance with the PURC's expectations. Upon such discovery or
receipt of complaint, the PURC shall in writing "direct the provision of
the adequate or reasonable service that should be provided by the public
utility and may include such other directions as to secure compliance." 25
A direction by the PURC may include "payment of compensation by the
public utility to any consumer for damage or loss suffered on account of

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at § 3(a) -(g).
Id.at§3(h).
Id. at § 3(i).
Id.at§4.
PURC, supra note 118, at § 11.
Id. at § 12(1).
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the failure of the public utility to comply with" the Act.12 6 Furthermore,
in the event that:
the technology employed by a public utility is out of date or
where any advance in technology which could result in an
improvement in the service or in reducing the cost of the
consumer, has not been incorporated in the service within a
reasonable time, the Commission may in writing direct the
public utility to take such measures as the Commission considers
appropriate to remedy the omission.127
Directions in this regard shall specify the time for compliance, as long as
reasonable; and if the compliance is in stages, specify the time per
stage. 28
The PURC is also responsible for monitoring the performance standards
of public utilities as established by the licensing authorities of the
particular public utility.' 29 It is important to note that where a public
utility fails to meet any required performance standard, the public utility
may be required to compensate any person adversely affected as a result
of a failure by the PURC, in an amount to be determined by the PURC
after consulting the licensing authority.' However, the requirement for
payment of compensation does not limit the right of the adversely
affected complainant to any other available legal remedy and does not
preclude the PURC from taking other measures or imposing other
sanctions that it has the right to impose for an act or omission that
constitutes the failure. 3 '
To guarantee confidence and the sanctity of agreements reached in
respect to energy infrastructure development or expansion of energy
services by a public utility, in the event of a failure or breach of such
agreement, the PURC is empowered to direct the public utility who has
failed or refused to implement the terms of an agreement to pay the
aggrieved party within a reasonable time such sum as the PURC
considers reasonable in the circumstances of the case. 3 2 In other
circumstances where payment to the aggrieved party may not create
adequate sanctions, the PURC may instead recommend to the licensing
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at § 12(2).
Id. at § 12(3).
Id. at § 12(4).
PURC, supra note 118, at § 13(1).
Id. at § 13(2).
Id. at§ 13(3).
Id. at §§ 14(1), (2)(b).
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authority of the concerned public utility, the cancellation or suspension
of its license or give such other directions as it considers just in the
circumstances of the case.'
However, it is important to note that PURC intervention and exercise of
its power shall be upon receipt of a complaint that the agreement has not
been not implemented within a reasonable time in a material respect and
that both the complainant and the public utility have been given the
opportunity to be heard and that the public utility has been unable to
provide a reasonable excuse for not implementing the agreement within a

reasonable time.134
Another significant provision of the Act which gives credence to the
correlation between law, state institutions and energy infrastructure
development, is Section 23. This provision provides that a "public utility
may permit the joint use of its equipment and facilities by another public
utility for a reasonable compensation where such arrangement is
convenient or necessary and the use will not result in damage to the
owner or other users of the equipment.""' Although this is a voluntary
joint use of facilities, Section 23(3) of the Act makes the joint use of
facilities compulsory where the PURC "is satisfied after investigation
that such joint use of equipment and facilities . . . is necessary to provide
safe, adequate, and economic service to consumers [and the joint use]
will not result in irreparable damage to the owners or users of the
equipment or facilities.""' Instead, the joint use must be just and
3
reasonable with regard to the circumstances of the case. 1
This directive on joint use of facilities, even though mandatory, is subject
to review by the PURC, which may upon a complaint from any public
utility or consumer affected by the directives, modify or revoke such
directives at any time.' The provision on joint use of equipment and
facilities is considered significant due to the fact that the regulatory
Commission is given the power to do what is necessary to be done to
ensure that public utility service delivery is unhindered and that at all
times, the overall interest of the country should be the primary
consideration.
In putting to effect the regulatory provision of the Act, the PURC
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at § 14(2)(b).
PURC, supra note 18, at § 14(2).
Id. at §23(1).
Id. at§ 23(3).
Id. at § 23(3)(c).
Id.
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has issued guidelines for setting tariffs in respect of generation,
transmission, and distribution of electricity. These guidelines
provided for a transparent and predictable mechanism for setting
rates. In addition to this, an Automatic Adjustment Formula has
been introduced to allow for quarterly revisions of tariffs to
reflect fluctuations in crude oil prices and foreign exchange
rates, as well as the hydro-thermal generation mix and changes
in the consumer price index. With the automatic adjustment
formula in place, major tariff reviews would take place every
four years. The tariff review process is quite transparent and both
the public and consumers are involved through the public
hearings system.'19
The generation and supply of electricity in Ghana has improved
tremendously because the regulation and operations are under a
transparent regime. Similarly, another far reaching provision of the
PURC that buttresses the argument on the importance of the state and
content of law is the fact that any public utility that fails to comply with
the standards of performance in the provision of utility services, or
refuses to provide utility service adequately and reasonably, or charges
or demands for service rates not approved by the PURC, or charges or
demands a higher rate than the rate approved by the PURC commits an
offense and is liable to incur penalties.
III.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria and Ghana, as former British colonies, share similar historical
antecedents in terms of laws and public institutions that regulated various
sectors of their respective economies. Although this paper does not probe
into the actual reasons for the deplorable state of the electricity sectors in
both countries, it is safe to assume that because they are each a former
British colony and have both adopted British common law, similar laws
may have regulated the countries during the colonial period and
immediately after independence. It is therefore likely that the weaknesses
and inadequacies in those laws partly contributed to the decay and
collapse of energy infrastructure before each country adopted its own
reform strategies to reposition their electricity sectors respectively.
Whereas the intent and purpose of the reform strategies are not radically
different as both emphasize private participation, competition, and a
transparent licensing regime, the content of their respective laws and the
role of the state institutions to drive the reform and ensure its success
139.

GUIDE TO ELECTRIC POWER IN GHANA, supra note 86.
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have played a significant role in determining the rate and stage of success
achieved by the two countries.
A review of the applicable laws in both countries shows that the legal
and regulatory regime of the Ghanaian energy sector appears to be more
focused on tackling infrastructure challenges than the legal and
regulatory regime in Nigeria. Even when it cannot be said that Ghana has
successfully overcome its energy infrastructure development challenges,
on account of noticeable deficits in terms of power outage, shedding and
technical losses, the fact that the country has recorded some gains in the
areas of the amount of power generated and reduction in power outage
are indication that it is on the right track. This relative success, as
compared to the Nigerian situation, may not be unconnected to the
content of the Ghanaian energy sector legal reform, the independence of
her institutions, particularly the Energy Commission as a central
coordinating body. Also, the implementation and enforcement powers
against a policy formulation and information gathering organ in the case
of its Nigerian counterpart is clear evidence that a correlation exist
between the content of the law and consequential outcomes.
Furthermore, the direct connection and coordination of electricity
generation, supply, and distribution on the one hand, and natural gas
resources of the Ghanaian Energy Commission on the other hand, may
also be identified as effective approaches in dealing with the challenges
of energy infrastructure development, because they afford the regulatory
agency the opportunity to agree to the terms for the supply of natural gas
for power generation in a very easy and less strenuous manner. The
Ghanaian approach is therefore more result oriented when compared to
the protracted process experienced in Nigeria among the Power Holding
Company of Nigeria, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and
its affiliate, the Nigerian Gas Company as well as their foreign associates
in concluding a natural gas sale and supply agreement for gas to power
generation. Consequently, from the review of the content of laws in both
countries, the various state institutions and their performance index,
which places Ghana ahead of Nigeria, it is submitted that there is indeed
a correlation between the content of the law, the state institutions and
energy infrastructure development.
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